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Abstract
We examine the decision to prepay a fixed rate mortgage in the UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia
and New Zealand. These countries are characterised by having substantial fees which are associ-
ated with breaking a fixed rate mortgage. We develop a model which allows for fluctuations both
in banks’ wholesale rates and credit spreads. We find that households can achieve economically
significant benefits both from following an optimal prepayment strategy contingent on the break
fee used by their bank, and also by selection of fixed interest rate term and (where available)
break fee structure.
Refinancing of mortgages is a well understood phenomenon in the US, both by households and
academics. Theoretical work (such as Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1987, 1992, 1993) and
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Stanton (1995)) has been supplemented and supported by empirical work (such as Deng, Quigley
and van Order (2000)) suggesting that households do indeed manage their mortgages in an optimal
fashion.
In contrast, however, refinancing outside the US is relatively unexplored territory. Countries such as
the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland, contrary to the US, do not have widespread
securitisation of mortgages (see Murphy (1996)). As a result, individual banks are left bearing all
risk concerned with their lending. To mitigate this risk, contracts offered in these countries tend to
be simpler than their US counterparts, rendering them easier instruments to hedge.
Firstly, mortgages are recourse loans. If a borrower fails to make payments on his loan, the bank can
first seize the house securing the loan, and can then hold the borrower responsible for any remaining
liability. This largely eliminates the first option available to many US households with respect to
their debt: the default option.1
As well as differing from a default perspective, most loans only allow borrowers to fix their interest
rates for fairly short periods of time (rarely exceeding five years) relative to the mortgage’s overall
life. Hence these fixed rate loans are more similar to hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) in
the US. Borrowers also have a predilection for variable rate loans, in contrast to US mortgagors,
who generally choose to fix their loans. Daniel (2008) notes that in Australia approximately 80% of
borrowers choose a variable rate loan over a fixed rate loan.2 When a bank makes a fixed rate loan,
it typically handles its interest rate risk by entering into an amortising swap so as to convert the
borrower’s fixed payments into a floating payment, which better matches the bank’s funding sources
(being mostly deposits or short maturity bills).
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The last major distinction from US mortgages is the main focus of this paper. In all the countries
considered here, prepayment of a fixed rate loan is associated with a financial penalty, which we refer
to as a break fee.
In the case of the UK, as discussed in Azevedo-Pereira, Newton and Paxson (2002), this break fee is
generally a constant proportion of the principal outstanding on the loan. The analysis of refinancing
options is thus fairly similar to that in the US. Even after paying a fee to refinance, Azevedo-Pereira
et al. (2002) find that households can have a valuable refinancing option. More recently, a number
of UK banks have begun offering break fees which decline as the mortgage’s fixed term declines.3
Canada and Ireland, in contrast to the UK, both feature break fees which are calculated more
consistently with the bank’s actual loss from the borrower’s prepayment. Canadian and Irish banks
will calculate a break fee for a household based on the income lost if the bank relent the money
prepaid for a fixed term equal to the remaining fixed term of the original mortgage, but at interest
rates prevailing at the time of the mortgage being broken. Since in most cases, the household is
choosing to prepay their loan because rates have fallen, the notional new loan would be at a lower
rate than the prepaid loan, and a fee is levied. We refer to such a break fee as a retail break fee,
since its size will be critically contingent on movements in retail interest rates. In Canada, this fee is
normally subject to a minimum break fee of three months interest. Canadian banks also often offer
customers the choice of a break fee free mortgage (an open mortgage as opposed to the conventional
closed mortgage) but at a substantial spread over the usual fixed rate, and generally for a short fixed
term (one year or shorter).
A retail break fee accurately represents a lender’s loss in the event that a new customer is found to
replace the prepaying borrower. However, if no new customer can be found, an alternative response
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would be to unwind the swap which was used to align the mortgage’s payments with the bank’s
funding sources. If a bank calculates its break fee to compensate for this loss, we refer to this as a
wholesale break fee, since the profit or loss on the swap will be determined by wholesale rates.4 This
form of break fee is most prevalent in Australia and New Zealand. In these two countries, the market
is divided between banks using a wholesale break fee policy, and those using a retail break fee policy.
Table 1 summarises the different break fee regimes across countries.
[Table 1 about here.]
We note that retail and wholesale break fees can vary wildly as interest rates change. Figure 1 shows
a history of five year retail and wholesale rates in New Zealand over the last ten years, along with
proportional break fees for a five year fixed rate loan prepaid after one year. In many instances, rates
were higher at the break date than at inception, resulting in no break fee. However, during 2009,
retail break fees rose to be as high as 8.7%, and wholesale break fees peaked at 15.2% of principal
prepaid. We further note that in spite of this, there was substantial prepayment activity during 2008,
with at least 6.9% of all five year fixed term mortgages being prepaid in December 2008.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Much empirical work has been undertaken on mortgage behaviour in these countries.5 However, with
the exception of the work by Azevedo-Pereira, Newton and Paxson (2002, 2003) on the UK mortgage
system, very little theoretical work has been done to understand the effect of the refinancing option for
households. In particular, it is unclear the extent to which mortgages subject to retail or wholesale
break fees contain embedded refinancing options, if at all. The stylised fact (see Breslaw, Irvine
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and Rahman (1996) and Miles (2004)) has been one wherein households make a decision between
uncertain payments and a fixed payment - a decision which is largely contingent on risk preferences.6
This paper aims to perform a similar option theoretic analysis to that offered for US mortgages.
We develop a two-factor model for mortgage interest rates, where retail rates are composed of a
wholesale rate plus a spread. We explore the optimal exercise policy for mortgage refinancing under
the various break fee regimes prevalent in our collection of countries. We find scope for mortgagors
to profit by managing their refinancing decision particularly under mechanical break fees (as found
in the UK) and under wholesale break fees. We then explore, in the spirit of Stanton and Wallace
(1998), whether there exists an optimal mortgage for a household, based on interest rates and the
household’s expected tenure in the property. We find that mortgagors can, in some circumstances,
achieve substantial economic gains through mortgage selection. We also find that in the UK and in
Australasia, mortgagors may have an optimal bank to approach, based on break fee policies.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section discusses our theoretical
model for mortgage prepayment decision, the following section discusses the estimation of model
parameters, while the subsequent section presents the findings of our work, both in terms of exercise
strategies and mortgage selection. The final section is the conclusion.
Theory
As noted in the introduction, loans in the collection of countries considered in this paper are recourse
loans, eliminating the possibility of profitable default. Although default can occur (and we will
allow for this in our modelling), it will in general leave the household worse off. We therefore model
5
default as an involuntary activity which may occur with some probability, and result in immediate
prepayment of the mortgage. Since the payoff in this state does not depend on the underlying house’s
price, a mortgage’s value becomes independent of house prices, and depends purely on interest rates.
When dealing with wholesale break fees (as encountered in Australia and New Zealand) the fee paid
by a prepaying household will depend on the level of wholesale swap rates between banks, while the
rate they face on a new loan will depend on retail rates. As a result, our model will require two state
variables, one to capture movements in wholesale rates, and one to capture credit spreads between
wholesale rates and retail rates. From these state variables, we will infer a term structure of mortgage
rates.
For each mortgage, we will also infer a hedge rate. The hedge rate is defined as being the wholesale
fixed rate which a bank would pay if it agreed to receive a (wholesale) floating rate payment based on
a principal which declines according to the mortgage’s principal. Entering into such a swap allows the
bank to eliminate the risk of wholesale rate fluctuations caused by financing a customer’s fixed rate
loan with short term (floating rate) debt. We will also be interested in valuing such a swap (given
that interest rates have changed since its inception) as this will be critical to evaluating wholesale
break fees.
Mortgage and hedge rates
We assume that mortgage rates are determined by two state variables: an instantaneous wholesale
rate rt, and an instantaneous credit spread st. Under the real world probability measure (P), the two
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variables follow the processes:
drt = ar(µr − rt)dt+ σrr
γr
t dW˜rt (1)
dst = as(µs − st)dt+ σss
γs
t (ρdW˜rt +
√
1− ρ2dW˜st) (2)
where ar, as, µr, µs, γr, γs, ρ, σr and σs are constants, and dW˜rt and dW˜st are independent Brownian
motions. This model allows for r and s to evolve randomly over time (t) with a magnitude of
volatility given by σr and σs. The variables γr and γs allows for absolute volatility to have varying
levels of proportionality with the level of rates and spreads (respectively). When γr or γs equals zero,
rate/spread absolute volatility does not depend on the level of rates/spreads (the Vasicek model)
while higher levels of γr and γs will result in higher rates/spreads leading to greater variability in
rate/spread innovations. In addition to volatility specification, the model allows for mean reversion
in rates/spreads, so that the wholesale rates and credit spreads tend to return to levels µr and µs
respectively. The speed of mean-reversion can also be varied by varying ar and as. Broze, Scaillet and
Zako¨ıan (1994) show that the individual processes are stable (unconditional moments exist) provided
γr and γs are both less than one.
Although the dynamics of interest rates in the real world are interesting for empirical work, in
order to price securities or make decisions regarding refinancing, we must work in the risk neutral
probability measure. We assume constant market prices of risk (ξr and ξs for the two Brownian
motions respectively) so that under the risk-neutral probability measure (Q), we have dW˜rt = dWrt−
ξrdt and dW˜st = dWst − ξsdt where dWrt and dWst are the increments of independent Brownian
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motions under Q, so that:
drt = [ar(µr − rt)− ξrσrr
γr
t ] dt+ σrr
γr
t dWrt (3)
dst =
[
as(µs − st)− ξˆsσss
γs
t
]
dt+ σss
γs
t (ρdWrt +
√
1− ρ2dWst) (4)
where ξˆs ≡ ρξr +
√
1− ρ2ξs.
The instantaneous retail mortgage rate is given by rt + st. Longer term discount factors can be
inferred from these processes. We denote the retail discount factor for time T , observed at time
t as dRt (T ) = EQ
(
e−
∫
T
t
rθ+sθdθ
)
, and the wholesale discount factor as dWt (T ) = EQ
(
e−
∫
T
t
rθdθ
)
.7
Discount factors represent the values of zero coupon bonds maturing at future dates, discounted
at either retail (dRt ) or wholesale (d
W
t ) rates. Closed form solutions are available for wholesale
discount factors, provided γr = 0 or γr = 0.5, and for retail discount factors under the condition
ρ = 0, γr = 0 or 0.5, γs = 0 or 0.5, γrξr = γsξs = 0, since in these cases the model reduces to the
affine framework (see Duffie and Kan (1996)). For more general parameter cases (as explored in this
paper) numerical solution is required.8
Having established a set of dynamics for short term interest rates, we now show how longer term
interest rates can be derived from this framework. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, we are interested
in two sets of rates: mortgage rates themselves, and the rate appropriate for an amortising swap which
a bank might use to hedge its position in a mortgage (the corresponding hedge rate).
Given (3-4), standard asset pricing results allow us to characterise the value of securities as the
solutions of partial differential equations. Denoting the value of a security as g per unit of principal,
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and the contract’s time t principal as Pt, we can write:
1
Pt
∂
∂t
[gPt] + [ar(µr − rt)− ξrσrr
γr
t ]
∂g
∂rt
+
[
as(µs − st)− ξˆsσss
γs
t
] ∂g
∂st
+
1
2
∂2g
∂r2t
σ2rr
2γr
t +
1
2
∂2g
∂s2t
σ2ss
2γs
t +
∂2g
∂rt∂st
ρσrr
γr
t σss
γs
t
= A(rt, st)g −Kt. (5)
Here A(rt, st) = rt for a security which is valued by discounting at wholesale rates (such as the fixed
of floating legs of a swap) and A(rt, st) = rt+ st for an instrument whose value should be discounted
at retail rates (such as when valuing the remaining payments of a mortgage). Kt is the payment
which the security makes at time t (per unit of principal) which may itself be a function of rt and st
(as would be the case in valuing the floating leg of a swap).
We denote the time t0 mortgage rate for a new mortgage with maturity date T and end of fixed
period τ < T as Rt0(τ, T ). Mortgage rates must be consistent with the process for retail rates. This
implies that the present value of the outstanding principal at the end of the mortgage’s fixed period,
plus the value of the mortgage’s fixed payments must be equal to the initial principal of the loan
(here assumed to be one). Mathematically, assuming continuous payment of interest and principal,
for a mortgage incepted at time t0 and observed at a later time t, the continuous coupon payment
on the mortgage per unit of principal (and unit of time) is given by:
Ct(t0, τ, T, Rt0(τ, T )) =
Rt0(τ, T )
1− e−Rt0 (τ,T )(T−t)
. (6)
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Outstanding principal at time t is given by
Pt =
1− e−Rt0 (τ,T )(T−t)
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−t0)
. (7)
Given (6) and (7), the mortgage’s rate Rt0(τ, T ) must satisfy
1− e−Rt0 (τ,T )(T−τ)
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−t0)
dRt0(τ) +
Rt0(τ, T )
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−t0)
∫ τ
t0
dRt0(θ)dθ = 1. (8)
If we know the value of a zero coupon bond maturing at the end of the mortgage’s fixed term, and
the annuity factor (
∫ τ
t0
dt0(t)dt) we can find the mortgage rate Rt0(τ, T ) by solving (8). These two
components can be priced by solving (5). In the case of the zero coupon bond, we set Pt = 1,
A(rt, st) = rt + st and Kt = 0, with terminal condition g(T ) = 1. For the annuity factor, we set
Pt = 1, A(rt, st) = rt + st, Kt = 1, and set the terminal condition g(T ) = 0.
We also define the associated hedge rate for a new mortgage set up at time t0, with maturity T and
fixed period ending at time τ as rt0(τ, T ). The hedge rate is defined as the fixed rate which would
be paid on a τ − t0 year fixed-floating swap which has declining principal identical to that of the
associated mortgage. To calculate the hedge rate, we solve
EQ
(∫ τ
t0
Pθrθe
−
∫
θ
t0
rzdzdθ
)
− rt0(τ, T )
∫ τ
t0
Pθd
r
t0
(θ)dθ = 0. (9)
The first term of (9) represents the value of the floating leg of the swap, while the second term
represents the value of the fixed leg. We can evaluate the first integral by solving (5), with A(rt, st) =
rt and Kt = rt. The second integral is a wholesale annuity factor (albeit with declining principal)
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and can be solved similarly to the retail case, with A(rt, st) = rt and Kt = 1. For both valuing the
floating leg of the swap, and for valuing the annuity factor, the terminal condition is g(T ) = 0.
Mortgage valuation
We assume that a borrower may need to sell their house for reasons exogenous to the model (examples
of these could be an inability to service the loan due to income loss, lifestyle considerations causing
the borrower to need a larger/smaller home, or moving locations for employment reasons). In this
case, the borrower could either exit the housing market, or could buy a new house and require a new
mortgage. For simplicity, we assume that in the event of buying a new house, the new mortgage is
of identical (or larger) size to the existing loan, so that we can treat this as a refinancing of existing
debt.9 These two outcomes (exiting the housing market and buying a new house) occur with constant
Poisson intensities of λ1dt and λ2dt respectively. In both cases, the household must pay any break
fees associated with their existing mortgage.10
A mortgage’s value at any point in time will depend on its structure, the current level of r and s, and
also the mortgage’s interest rate. For mortgages with wholesale break fees, the mortgage’s associated
hedge rate will also affect its value, since it will affect break fees, if they occur. Hence we may write
the value of a mortgage, observed at time t, created at time t0 ≤ t, per unit of principal as being:
f(t, rt, st, τ, T, Rt0(τ, T ), rt0(τ, T )).
A borrower choosing a new mortgage at time t, where maturities of t, t + 1, . . . t + τ¯ are available,
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solves the problem:
min
τ=t,...,t+τ¯
τ≤T
f(t, rt, st, τ, T, Rt(τ, T ), rt(τ, T )) ≡ f
∗(t, T, rt, st).
Note that τ = t is a possibility, since the household could choose a floating rate loan instead of a
fixed loan.
Since the mortgage’s value depends on the two state variables rt and st, standard no-arbitrage
arguments show that f satisfies the differential equation:
1
Pt
∂
∂t
[Ptf ] + [ar(µr − rt)− ξrσrr
γr
t ]
∂f
∂rt
+
[
as(µs − st)− ξˆsσss
γs
t
] ∂f
∂st
+
1
2
∂2f
∂r2t
σ2rr
2γr
t +
1
2
∂2f
∂s2t
σ2ss
2γs
t +
∂2f
∂rt∂st
ρσrr
γr
t σss
γs
t
+λ1(1 +Bt − f) + λ2(f
∗ − f +Bt)
≤ (rt + st)f − Ct(t0, τ, T, Rt0(τ, T )) (10)
where Bt is the full break fee associated with the mortgage, which potentially depends on the current
level of interest rates, as well as the mortgage’s characteristics (see below). Ct and Pt are given by
equations (6-7).
Equation (10) is defined in conjunction with either one or two complementary slackness conditions,
associated with the refinancing options available to the borrower. The first condition applies to all
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mortgages:
f ≤ f ∗ + Bt, (11)
meaning that a household can always choose to completely repay their mortgage. However, in some
circumstances, a household may be forgiven a certain portion of their loan prepayment, as a fraction
of their initial principal (denoted ψ). In this case, it is also potentially optimal for the household to
prepay only the forgiven portion of their loan, in which case we have the additional complementary
slackness condition
f ≤ max
(
0, 1−
ψPt0
Pt
)
f ′ +min
(
1,
ψPt0
Pt
)
f ∗ (12)
where f ′ is the value (per unit of principal) of an otherwise identical mortgage where ψ = 0. In
the presence of a forgiven portion of the loan, we replace the break fee the household would pay for
terminating their entire loan (Bt in equations (10) and (11)) with
B
(ψ)
t = Btmin
(
1,
ψPt0
Pt
)
.
Lastly, the terminal condition for (10-12) is given by f(τ) = f ∗(τ), since on conclusion of the
mortgage’s fixed term, the mortgagor can freely choose a new fixed term.
Note that equation (10) is similar to equation (5) with the addition of the λ terms (handling subopti-
mal prepayment) and the replacement of equality with an inequality coupled with the complementary
slackness conditions (handling optimal prepayment).
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Calculating break fees
As discussed in the introduction, we consider three types of break fee: those which do not depend
on interest rates, those based on retail rates, and those based on the cost of breaking the swap a
bank has entered into. We focus here on a household who prepays their entire principal outstanding.
Similar calculations hold for partial prepayments, scaled accordingly. We express break fees relative
to current principal outstanding, as per (10).
Non-rate dependent break fees
The break fees found in the United Kingdom are the most straightforward to describe. We consider
two possible break fees here. The first break fee is simply a flat portion of the principal outstanding,
as considered by Azevedo-Pereira et al. (2002) and Chen, Connolly, Tang and Su (2009).
Break fee (flat) = ζ1
where ζ1 is a constant. The second type of break fee considered is a declining fee. Here the fee is
proportional to the time remaining of the fixed term:
Break fee (declining) = ζ2(τ − t)
where ζ2 is a constant. In general ζ2 > ζ1. The rationale for charging a declining fee is that the
bank’s loss, either due to having to relend the prepaid principal at lower rates, or break a hedging
swap, declines as the mortgage approaches the end of its fixed term. We can thus see the declining
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fee as a (very) rough approximation of the retail/wholesale break fee schemes.
Retail break fees
Here the fee is calculated according to the assumption that once the household pays off its loan, the
bank will proceed to relend the money, under the same terms (τ and T ) as the existing loan. We
outline two possible ways in which this could be implemented.
Single discount rate (SDR) In this case, the bank calculates a rate for a new loan set up to
mature at time T , and conclude its fixed period at time τ . The household’s break fee is the value of
their remaining payments discounted at this rate (Rt(τ, T )), less the principal they are repaying:
Break fee (SDR. retail) =
Pτ
Pt
e−Rt(τ,T )(τ−t)
+Ct(t0, τ, T, Rt0(τ, T ))
∫ τ
t
e−Rt(τ,T )(θ−t)dθ − 1
=
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−τ)
1− e−Rt0 (τ,T )(T−t)
e−Rt(τ,T )(τ−t)
+
1− e−Rt(τ,T )(τ−t)
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−t)
Rt0(τ, T )
Rt(τ, T )
− 1. (13)
Note that for the case where Rt(τ, T ) = Rt0(τ, T ), the rate the bank will (notionally) relend the
money at is identical to the borrower’s current rate, and the break fee will be zero. If the break fee
is positive (the new rate is lower than the existing rate) the borrower will pay the fee. If the break
fee is negative, the borrower will pay nothing.
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Full valuation (FV) In this case, the bank values the household’s remaining payments, discounting
each at the appropriate zero coupon rate for that date, using (8). Given knowledge of the retail
annuity factor, and of the retail discount factor for the maturity date of the mortgage, we can
easily calculate the value of the mortgage’s remaining payments. The break fee is then given by the
difference between this market value and the principal the household repays:
Break fee (FV. retail) =
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−τ)
1− e−Rt0(τ,T )(T−t)
dRt (τ)
+
Rt0(τ, T )
1− e−Rt0 (τ,T )(T−t)
∫ τ
t
dRt (θ)dθ − 1. (14)
Note that the only differences between (13) and(14) are the substitution of dRt (θ) for e
−Rt(τ,T )(θ−t) as
the integrand of the second term and dRt (τ) for e
−Rt(τ,T )(τ−t) in the first term. The FV and SDR break
fees will not exactly match (except for the case where Rt(τ, T ) = Rt0(τ, T )), since the new retail rate
is calculated based upon amortising occurring consistent with the new rate, whereas the existing cash
flows are amortising consistent with the mortgage’s original rate. The difference between these two
numbers are generally small, except in situations where the change in interest rates has been very
large. In our analyses in this paper, for brevity, we use only the full valuation technique in our retail
rate calculations.11
Wholesale break fee
In this case, the lender assumes that in the event of prepayment, no new loan is entered into, so
that the mortgagee’s hedge position must be unwound. The swap in question would have a notional
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principal on any date equal to the amortised principal of the actual mortgage. The hedge swap can be
valued after its initial creation, at time t, per unit of principal, by evaluating the difference between
the floating leg (which the bank receives) value and the fixed leg (which the bank pays) value:
EQ
(∫ τ
t
Pθ
Pt
rθe
−
∫
θ
t
rzdzdt
)
− rt0(τ, T )
∫ τ
t
Pθ
Pt
drt (θ)dθ. (15)
Note that (15) is simply the left hand side of (9).
There are certain similarities between the retail break fee and the wholesale break fee. In both cases,
if interest rates decline, the household will be penalised (either because the household’s remaining
payments will be more valuable, or because the bank will have lost money on its swap). The sensitivity
of this penalty will also decline as the loan approaches the end of its fixed term. However the critical
difference between the two fees is the rate which determines the break fee. In the case of the wholesale
break fee, the rate which is critical for the household’s valuation of the mortgage is the retail rate,
while its break fee is being calculated based on wholesale rates. As such, the household may profit
substantially from refinancing in situations where wholesale rates have risen (the bank has made a
profit on its swap) but retail rates have fallen (presumably due to a decline in s).
Solution technique
We proceed by first deriving term structures of interest rates for different levels of state variables
r and s. Using these, we are then able to solve for mortgage values, conditional on the mortgage’s
remaining life, the initial fixed term, the current fixed term, and term structures of interest rates.
We price these in tandem, allowing us to consider the refinancing options available to the household.
17
Further details are given in the appendix.
Parameter estimation
Data for one month wholesale interest rates are obtained from Datastream interbank rates. Floating
mortgage rates are generally available from the central bank of each country. We augment these
with longer maturity swap rates and mortgage rates. For Australia and New Zealand, we add 3 year
rates, for Canada and the UK 5 year rates, and for Ireland we use the reported rate for loans from
1-5 year fixed term, which we take to represent a 3 year rate. Data cover the period January 1999
to December 2009, except for Ireland, where data are only available from January 2003.
For the UK floating rate, we use standard variable rate (SVR) data. Banks in the UK generally offer
two different types of floating rate loan. The first rate, a “standard variable rate” loan, has payments
based on the bank’s own floating rate. A “tracker” loan, in contrast, has payments directly pegged
to the Bank of England’s interest rates. Banks often “buffer” their customers against changes in the
Bank of England rates, lowering their SVR rates less in response to a cut, and raising SVR rates less
in response to a rate hike by the central bank. The tracker loan is thus more similar to an American
ARM rate. However, the standard variable rate loan is more comparable to floating rate loans in the
other countries we consider here, so we use SVR data to estimate our model.
Stochastic processes (1-2) could be estimated using General Method of Moments (GMM) as described
in Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff and Sanders (1992), however this approach would encounter two prob-
lems. Firstly, we are interested in not only estimating the real world (P) process followed by interest
rates, but also require estimates of the market prices of risk (ξr and ξs) in order to implement our
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model (using the Q probability measure). Secondly, as shown by Ball and Torous (1996) and Faff
and Gray (2006), GMM estimates of short rate processes exhibit bias, particularly in the estimates
of mean reversion parameters.
In light of these shortcomings, following Ball and Torous (1996) we implement an extended Kalman
filter estimation of the short rate processes. We treat the short rates (r and s) as state variables
and our floating mortgage rates, interbank interest rates, swap rates and longer term mortgage rates
as observed variables. Since our observed rates (as discussed in the first section) depend on the
risk-neutral processes followed by r and s, this approach also allows us to extract the market prices
of risk.12
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 contains the results of our estimation. Perhaps the most striking observation is the negative
correlation between spreads and the wholesale rate. This suggests that in most of our countries, as
is the case in the UK, a rise in wholesale rates is not completely passed through to customers, nor is
a decline. This effect, in New Zealand, is documented by Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad (2008).13
The second empirical observation is the marked difference between ar and as. With the exception of
Ireland, all the countries exhibit a much more rapid mean reversion for credit spreads than is the case
for wholesale rates. The implication of this for our model is that fluctuations in credit spreads will
lead to marked changes in the slope of the retail mortgage yield curve, whereas changes in wholesale
rates will generally result in more parallel shifts in the curve.
We note a reasonable dispersion in γr and γs. The Canadian and UK wholesale rate processes have
very low values for γr showing some similarity to the Vasicek model (γ = 0). In contrast, both
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Australian interest rate processes, the Irish credit spread process and the New Zealand wholesale
rate process have values of γ between 0.5 and 1, lying somewhere between a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
process (γ = 0.5) and a Gaussian process (γ = 1). Evaluating the volatility terms (σrr
γr and σss
γs)
at the long run levels of r and s (µr and µs respectively) gives an idea of the absolute volatility of
wholesale rates and spreads, respectively. We find that this absolute volatility varies between 0.0075
(Ireland) and 0.0121 (New Zealand) for wholesale rates, and between 0.0022 (Ireland) and 0.0077
(Canada) for credit spreads. The lack of volatility in Ireland is not surprising, given that Ireland
uses the Euro as a currency, and therefore interest rates in Ireland will be consistent with Eurozone
rates.
Lastly, the estimates of ξr are universally negative. The result of this is that the steady state for
wholesale rates is higher in the risk-neutral world (r¯) than in the real world (µr). Hence the model
will generate persistent upward sloping wholesale curves, as observed empirically. For credit spreads,
with the exception of Canada, we observe the opposite behaviour, with the risk-neutral steady-state
credit spread (s¯) being less than the real world steady-state (µs).
Results
To understand the optimal selection of mortgages, it is important to begin by understanding when
a mortgage should be prepaid. Since our model, by construction, offers borrowers long term rates
which are consistent with the short interest rate processes, a borrower who takes out a fixed rate
loan and services it until the end of the fixed term will have created a debt instrument whose value is
identical to the initial principal of the loan. Similarly, a borrower who takes out a floating rate loan
will also create a debt instrument which is valued at par. However, a borrower who exercises their
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option to prepay optimally, will produce an instrument whose value is below par. By examining the
extent to which this is the case for a particular borrower for different mortgage structures, we can
ascertain both the best choice of mortgage for the borrower, and also measure the economic gain
from selection and timing of mortgage prepayment.
We thus begin by discussing the optimal prepayment of mortgages, exploring how this behaviour
changes as the fee structure of the loan changes. Next, we explore the optimal selection of mortgages,
both in terms of fixed horizon and break fee, and show how this varies across countries and levels of
the state variables of our model. Lastly, we examine the economic significance of our results, both
for borrowers and lenders.
Optimal prepayment strategies
For this section, we focus our attention on the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. Since
Irish banks make use of retail break fees, and Australian banks use retail and wholesale break fees, the
results for New Zealand provide most of the intuition for these two countries. The United Kingdom
case explores the effect of formulaic break fees, while the Canadian case highlights the effect of open
versus closed mortgages. We return attention to Ireland and Australia in our subsequent discussion
of mortgage selection and value gains.14
For each country, we consider two cases. In the first, the borrower is intransient, with λ1 = λ2 = 0.
This borrower is assumed, therefore, to remain in their house for the entire life of the mortgage in
question. The second borrower has λ1 = λ2 = 0.1. This borrower thus has a 20% probability of
selling their house each year. Conditional on selling the house, with probability 50%, the borrower
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buys a new house (and therefore takes out a new mortgage), while with probability 50%, they do
not buy a new house, and therefore do not require a new mortgage. Both borrowers are assumed to
have taken on a 30 year amortising loan, and to have fixed their loan for five years. In all cases, the
first 20% of prepayments are taken to be forgiven (ψ = 0.2 in inequality (12)).
Our goal in this section is to explore how a borrower with a five year fixed term mortgage should
manage their prepayment decision. To evaluate the optimal exercise frontier, we require details of
the borrowers’ interest payments. For each country, we perturb the short rates/spreads generated
by the extended Kalman filter for December 2009 so that selection of a five year fixed rate mortgage
(with declining break fee in the UK, wholesale break fee in New Zealand and closed structure in
Canada) is optimal for the intransient borrower, when compared with other maturities (see figures
5-7).15 Our mortgage and hedge rates considered for each country are given in table 3.
A household with a mortgage can be in one of two circumstances. In the first circumstance, they have
a mortgage which has not had any portion prepaid. In this case, they have two options available for
them in terms of prepayment. The first option is to prepay the forgiven portion of their loan. This
will entail no break fee. The second option is to prepay the entirety of their mortgage. This latter
option will entail paying a break fee on the unforgiven portion. The second situation a household
could find itself in would be where they have already prepaid the forgiven portion of their loan,
and now their only option is to prepay the remaining portion of their loan, incurring a break fee
in the process. Our graphs thus present two exercise frontiers for the options, the first being the
combination of interest rates which would cause a household to pay off its initial forgiven portion,
and the second being the set of interest rates (subsequent to this) which would cause prepayment of
the unforgiven portion of the loan. In some circumstances, this second region of interest rates will
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be a superset of the first region, indicating that once the forgiven portion of the loan is prepaid, the
household should immediately prepay the unforgiven portion.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Before presenting results, we outline some over-arching principles. The household’s option to refinance
can be thought of as a call option, written on a bond which the household has issued to the bank.
The household will exercise this option when the bond is valuable relative to the costs of prepaying
and the time value of the option, which in turn depends on the volatility of interest rates and the
remaining time to maturity of the option. For a US mortgage, with no break fee, this unambiguously
occurs when retail rates are low. In our analyses, this relationship will be complicated by the fact
that break fees may themselves depend on the current level of interest rates.
Results for the UK are given in figure 2. We assume ζ1 = 0.03 while ζ2 = 0.01 so that the household
either pays a flat 3% break fee (fixed fee) or a 1% fee per year remaining in the loan (declining fee).
Each line represents the locus of points which would cause the borrower to prepay their mortgage.
Hence points below and to the left of the line are situations where the mortgage would be refinanced,
and those above and to the right are where the mortgage should continue to be serviced. For each
mortgage type, there are two lines. The first (solid) line represents the states where the household
should prepay the forgiven portion of their loan. The second (dashed) line represents the states where
the unforgiven portion of the loan should be prepaid. For each mortgage type and each borrower, we
show frontiers for 1 year and 4 years remaining of the mortgage’s fixed term.
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In each case, there is a negative relationship between the level of wholesale rate and spread which
trigger prepayment. This is because new rates the borrower can access depend on a combination of
both state variables. For a low wholesale rate, even for quite a high credit spread, the household may
be better off to refinance, since retail rates will still be low. Conversely, for a high wholesale rate, even
a very low level of credit spread may still render refinancing suboptimal, since retail rates will still be
high. The relationship is not exactly linear, because the mortgage depends on a combination of longer
maturity rates, each of which depend non-linearly on the state variables (due to mean-reversion).
Comparing across the time dimension, we note that for the forgiven portion of the loan, the household
becomes more willing to prepay as the end of the fixed term approaches (the exercise frontier shifts
upwards). This is caused by the diminishing time value of their option. For the portion of their
mortgage which attracts a break fee, we see that for borrowers with a fixed break fee, exercise is
(relatively) more attractive with four years of fixed term remaining since the dashed curve is higher,
requiring a smaller decline in r or s to trigger prepayment. Conversely, for the declining fee, exercise
in the later years of the mortgage’s fixed term is more attractive. This dichotomy makes intuitive
sense, since with a flat break fee, the per year fee is lower during the early part of the mortgage, but
higher later on.
Lastly, comparing the two borrowers (transient and intransient) we see very similar behaviour. In
our later examples, we note a slight tendency for the transient borrower toward prepayment. Again,
this follows from the time value of the option. Since the transient borrower faces the prospect of
suboptimal prepayment, their option time value is lower, and they are more inclined to prepay.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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In the Canadian case (see figure 3) we see the distinction between a closed and an open mortgage.
For the closed mortgage, a retail break fee is calculated, with a minimum of three months interest
charged. For the open mortgage, no break fee is charged, however, the borrower pays a 3% interest
premium for this privilege.
Focusing first on the closed mortgage, we again note the rising exercise frontiers as the mortgage
approaches the end of its fixed term, and a downward sloping frontier, due to the tradeoff between
r and s in determining retail rates. We note that for longer maturities, a borrower is liable to
break both sections of his mortgage in fairly rapid succession. Once rates have fallen low enough to
motivate prepayment of the forgiven section, even a small further decline will trigger prepayment of
the remainder of the loan. However, as maturity approaches, the three months interest minimum
break fee becomes more important (relative to the amount saved by the household by refinancing)
and renders prepayment less attractive.
For the open mortgage, there is no distinction between parts of the loan, since no fee is paid on
prepayment. However, since the mortgage pays interest at a rate in excess of the regular retail yield
curve, prepayment will be optimal at even higher levels of r and s than is the case for the forgiven
portion of a closed loan.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Lastly, figure 4 contains the optimal policies for our New Zealand borrowers. For the retail break fee
case, we note that the optimal exercise frontiers are actually slightly lower for the forgiven portion
of the loan than is the case for the fee-bearing portion. The reason for this is that the retail break
fee represents a lose-lose situation for the borrower: if the loan is prepaid when rates have fallen, the
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household loses all their refinancing gains to break fees. However, if rates have risen, the household
is uncompensated. Once the free portion of the loan has been prepaid, it is therefore immediately
optimal to prepay the remainder of the loan, since retail rates must be sufficiently low to place the
household in the break fee bearing region (by virtue of having just triggered prepayment of the free
portion).
The wholesale break fee case generates the most qualitatively different exercise frontiers. In this
case, because the break fee is based on the level of wholesale rates, whereas the household’s profit
from refinancing is based upon retail rates, we actually see a hump shaped relationship between
the levels of r and s which trigger prepayment. For high levels of wholesale rates, the household
faces no fee, and therefore prepays the unforgiven portion of the mortgage similarly to the forgiven
portion. However, if wholesale rates are low, the household faces a break fee which grows larger,
the lower wholesale rates have become. Hence the household requires a much lower level of retail
rate to trigger prepayment and therefore a lower level of credit spread. Note that if wholesale rates
are low, this can result in situations where the household prepays their forgiven portion, and does
not prepay the remainder of the loan, in contrast to the behaviour of a retail break fee borrower.
Examining the decision of a household to prepay the forgiven portion of their loan, we observe two
regions. For low wholesale rates (to the left of the figure) the household requires a lower retail rate
to trigger prepayment. However for higher wholesale rates (to the right of the figure) the value of
the prepayment option on the unforgiven portion of the loan rises dramatically, encouraging the
household to prepay the forgiven portion, hence we see the household’s optimal exercise frontier rise
as wholesale rates increase, becoming consistent with the frontier for the unforgiven portion of the
loan.
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Optimal selection of mortgage type
We next turn our attention to the optimal selection of a mortgage contract. Here we consider a range
of different levels for the instantaneous wholesale rate and spread. The optimal mortgage is the fixed
term (and where appropriate, break fee regime) which minimises the value of the household’s debt.
We focus here on a household whose mortgage will amortise over thirty years.
We again present results for both intransient (λ1 = λ2 = 0) and transient (λ1 = λ2 = 0.1) borrowers.
Clearly, this exercise could be repeated using a different level for λ1 and λ2, and would lead to
different preferred mortgage types for different short wholesale rates and spreads. Our two sets of
results provide a fairly clear indication of the qualitative effects of household transience on mortgage
selection. In all cases, we allow the mortgagor to fix their loan for a maximum of five years, consistent
with common lending practices. As was the case for analysis of optimal prepayment, we assume
ψ = 0.2 for all mortgages.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In many ways, the UK mortgage system presents the simplest case of mortgage selection. The
household chooses between a situation where early exercise of the prepayment option may be cheap
at the expense of late exercise (a flat fee) versus a fee which is liable to be more in line with option
exercise values (a declining fee). Figure 5 presents the optimal choice of mortgage. We consider
ζ1 = 0.006(τ − t0) and ζ2 = 0.01, so that the flat fee is 0.6% per year of fixed term, while the
declining fee remains 1% per remaining year of the loan.
For low levels of r and s (which imply low levels of retail rates) the optimal choice of mortgage is to
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float. Taking on a fixed rate loan (with either type of fee) has little potential for profitable refinancing,
since rates are unlikely to decline from present levels. Furthermore, for a transient borrower, there
exists the potential for suboptimal prepayment to result in a fee being paid. As retail rates increase
(moving up and to the right in the figures) the potential for a profitable refinancing becomes possible,
and eventually exceeds the risk due to suboptimal prepayment. As this occurs, longer fixed terms
become optimal. For the intransient borrower, there is no risk of suboptimal prepayment, and
therefore even for modest levels of r and s, a fixed rate contract becomes the preferred choice.
The two borrower types also have a preference for break fees when fixing for protracted periods.
For the transient borrower, uncertainty about their tenure in the loan reduces the value of later
optionality, and therefore choosing a flat fee (which offers better prepayment opportunities early in
the loan’s life) is preferable to a declining fee when choosing a longer fixed term. Conversely, the
intransient borrower has a preference for a declining fee, unless retail rates are very high (the top
right corner of the figure).
[Figure 6 about here.]
Canada and Ireland (figure 6), in contrast to the UK situation, both face mortgage choices where
the fee is based on the gain the household could achieve from refinancing their loan. The Irish case
shows the effect of a retail break fee with no minimum charge (similar to those found in New Zealand
and Australia). As noted when we examined optimal prepayment, this eradicates any potential for
profitable refinancing of the unforgiven portion of the loan, restricting optionality to the forgiven
portion. As was the case for the UK, borrowers trade off the risk of suboptimal exercise against
optimal exercise. Not surprisingly, the results are qualitatively similar: for low interest rates, floating
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is optimal, and as rates increase, fixing for longer terms becomes preferred. Again, intransient
borrowers have a preference for longer fixed terms.
Examining the case of the intransient Canadian borrower, we see similar behaviour. Low rates
encourage fixing for short terms. We note that the open mortgage is only optimal for extremely high
interest rates. For the transient borrower, however, results are quite stark. For almost all commonly
encountered levels of interest rates, floating is the optimal choice. The enforcement of a lower bound
on break fees almost completely eliminates option value for our transient borrower. We note that
borrowers with lower levels of λ1 and λ2 may find fixing optimal under lower retail rate regimes, since
their optimal selections will lie between the two cases considered here.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 7 contains the optimal selection for a household in New Zealand (top panel) and Australia
(bottom panel). For both countries, the figures can be essentially broken into three regions. For low
interest rates (both low wholesale rates and low spreads), a floating rate mortgage is most valuable,
for identical reasons to the UK, Irish and Canadian situation. As retail rates increase, fixing the
mortgage becomes valuable, since the possibility of using the refinancing option becomes feasible.
Generally speaking, the higher the retail rate, the longer the optimal fixing term becomes, since the
refinancing option becomes more and more valuable.
The selection of whether to choose a retail or wholesale break fee is a function of the level of the
credit spread and this divides the region where fixing is optimal into two sub-regions. As credit
spreads increase, there becomes a possibility of a mortgagor with a wholesale break fee being able to
refinance profitably, in a situation where retail rates fall, but wholesale rates rise (i.e. the decline in
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credit spread exceeds the rise in wholesale rates). This considerably increases the option value for
wholesale break fees. In contrast, for retail break fees, the household has no ability to profit in the
presence of break fees, and can only gain option value from the portion of their loan which is exempt
from break fees.
However, this option value must be weighed against the risk to the household of suboptimal exercise.
With a wholesale break fee, the household not only faces a loss if they prepay into a higher retail
rate, but also in the case when they prepay and the retail rate has fallen, but the wholesale rate has
fallen by more so that the break fee outweighs the mortgagor’s profit.16 This effect is most likely
to occur when credit spreads are low, and so in these situations, the mortgagor finds it optimal to
choose a retail based break fee.
Value gains from prepayment
Lastly, we turn our attention to the economic significance of the mortgage selection and optimal
refinancing decision. As noted previously, a household who either takes a floating loan or holds a fixed
loan until maturity creates a par value debt instrument. In contrast, a household who exercises their
prepayment option optimally will reduce the value of their loan. Since floating is always an option,
this will result in mortgage values below the loan’s principal. By taking the difference between the
mortgage’s value and the loan’s principal, we can ascertain the value gained from optimal prepayment
and mortgage selection. Note that this gain to the household is a loss to the lender of exactly the
same amount. This can be contrasted to the situation in US mortgages, where default on a loan
could lead to different losses for the two counterparties, if the household may face future credit costs
associated with the default. Here the situation is far simpler: a dollar gained by the mortgagor is a
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dollar lost to the mortgagee.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8 gives value gains for the United Kingdom. Clearly, the intransient investor achieves greater
gains through mortgage timing. In both cases, it is the high interest rate environments, where
long term fixing is optimal, where gains are greatest. We further note that in high credit spread
environments, the gains for the borrower can be quite substantial.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Figure 9 shows results for Canada and Ireland. Given that break fees in both these countries are
based on the retail methodology, the prepayment option is considerably less valuable than in the UK.
In both these countries, the household can only profit on prepaying the forgiven portion of the loan.
For the case of Canada, where fees have a minimum applied, we find that the gains for transient
borrowers are quite small. Even for intransient borrowers, mortgage choice and prepayment is of
small significance, rarely exceeding 1% of the loan’s principal. Irish results are more substantial,
with intransient borrowers frequently able to reduce loan value by 1.5%. Nevertheless, both types of
borrowers’ gains are far more subdued when compared to the UK numbers in figure 8.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Figure 10 shows results for Australia and New Zealand. For both countries, we observe the largest
gains to be achieved in situations where the wholesale break fee loan is optimal (high credit spreads
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and high wholesale rates). Here the household can profit both from prepaying the forgiven portion
of the loan, and also from prepaying the unforgiven portion.
Our results suggest three main lessons. Firstly, high interest rate environments promote fixing loans
for longer periods and lead to more value being captured by households, particularly those who use
their options optimally. Second, imposing minimum break fees, as in Canada, dramatically reduces
option values. Thirdly, break fees which allow households to refinance profitably (as is the case
with formulaic fees in the UK or wholesale break fees in Australasia) give the maximum scope for
household value capture.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have established a framework for modelling the prepayment timing and mortgage
selection problem of borrowers in a collection of countries whose lending regimes are characterised by
potentially substantial fees associated with unwinding of a fixed rate contract. Our findings suggest
that for all the countries considered, there is economically significant gain to be achieved by borrowers
at the expense of lenders.
Two comments regarding why this might occur are in order. First, it is difficult to see how banks
can price this out of the market. The problem for the lender is the unobservability of λ1 and λ2.
Under the US mortgage system, the use of points (see Stanton and Wallace (1998)) allows lenders to
generate a finely graded separating equilibrium where borrowers of varying degrees of transience pay
different up-front fees in order to reduce their mortgage rates. Without a points system in place, the
countries in our sample have only a relatively coarse set of products available, and therefore to price
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contracts so as to eliminate borrowers’ option values is difficult.
The second point relates to credit risk. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the banking
systems in our collection of countries are characterised by recourse lending regimes, meaning that
lenders can prosecute defaulting borrowers for the full value of their loan, rather than being limited to
seizing the property which secures the mortgage (as is the case in many US states). This eliminates
the default optionality which is common in US mortgages. However, it does not mean that default
is costless for the lender. Legal and administrative costs involved with default are still liable to
be substantial, resulting in dead-weight losses in the event of default. Our model suggests that
the households who best exploit prepayment opportunities are intransient households, who are also
probably those households who are less likely to default on their loans. Indirectly, these “good
risk” borrowers borrow more cheaply, since they extract gains from prepayment and loan selection.
Prepayment options thus provide a mechanism for attracting more creditworthy borrowers.
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Appendix: Solving the mortgage valuation problem
Assuming a constant unit Pt, we solve equations (5) and (10) using the Craig and Sneyd (1988)
Alternating Direction Implicit (ADI) finite difference algorithm. This technique works by splitting
the operator in equation (10) across the dimensions of the problem (r and s). The technique then
alternates which dimension is solved for implicitly, so that instead of requiring one huge system of
equations to be solved, many smaller systems must be solved. Craig and Sneyd (1988) improve
upon the regular Douglas (1962) style splitting by updating the cross-partial term between substeps
of the algorithm. This maintains the second order accuracy of the method, allowing us to take
larger time steps than would normally be possible when solving a problem with cross partial terms
using ADI methods. The finite difference method calculates security values at discrete grid points
t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T , r = r0, r0 +∆r, . . . , r0 +Nr∆r, s = s0, s0 +∆s, . . . , s0 +Ns∆s, where Nr and
Ns are constant integers. Solution proceeds by backward induction, solving for ft using the solution
at ft+∆t.
17
When dealing with a security with declining principal (as is the case for mortgage valuation or
hedge swap valuation), we value the security by rescaling the subsequent time step to account for the
security’s declining principal, i.e. working with a rescaled solution fˆt+∆t =
Pt+∆t
Pt
ft+∆t when evaluating
the security value at time t (ft).
We begin by using our algorithm to solve (5) in order to determine, for each point on our finite
difference grid, Rt(τ, T ) and rt(τ, T ) for τ = t+∆t, t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . ,min(t+ τ¯ , T ). This allows us to
determine retail rates and associated hedge rates for new mortgages available to the borrower at any
date.
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Next, we work backwards from time T . At each time step, we solve (10), with λ1 = λ2 = 0 for all
possible mortgages a household could hold. For a given type of break fee, this consists of: all possible
levels of rt0 and st0 , all possible current fixed terms (τ− t), and all possible initial fixed terms (τ− t0).
We repeat this exercise for each type of break fee available to the borrower, and also consider both
the case where the mortgage has ψ > 0 and ψ = 0 (i.e. we consider mortgages who have already had
their forgiven portion prepaid).
In tandem with solving for all the mortgages’ values, we also solve (5) to value the annuity factors
and zero coupon bond prices needed to evaluate equations (13 - 15). For the valuation of the hedge
swaps, we use a similar trick to the mortgages, by rescaling the solution to account for declining
principal.
Having solved (10) for each possible mortgage, we find f ∗ for each point in the grid. This allows us to
evaluate whether it is optimal to prepay each of our possible mortgages. Since we know the value of
mortgages with ψ = 0, we can evaluate whether it would be optimal to partially repay, if this option
has not been exercised yet. Finally, we adjust the solution to allow probability λ1∆t of prepayment
without refinancing and probability λ2∆t of prepayment with refinancing.
Our solution consists of matrices of mortgage values for each time step in our solution. We can also
produce matrices of the optimal fixing period to generate f ∗. Lastly, by examining the points where
the complementary slackness conditions (11-12) hold with equality, we can observe when a household
should prepay their mortgage.
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1This is not to say that default losses do not exist, as even with the right to pursue a household, the household’s
limited liquid wealth may lead to the mortgagee being unable to recover the shortfall between the house’s value and
the mortgage’s principal.
2Miles (2004) finds comparable numbers for the UK, with 25% of borrowers choosing a fixed rate in 2003. As at
December 2009, 16% of Irish mortgages (by value) had fixed terms of more than one year. In New Zealand, 36% of
loans (by value) were fixed for more than one year (although 38% were fixed for one year or less). Canada is slightly
anachronistic: Breslaw et al. (1996) find 72% of Canadian mortgages are fixed rate (in 1988). More recently, the FIRM
Residential Mortgage Survey (2009) finds 69% of Canadian loans are fixed rate.
3Much of the reason for the simplicity of UK break fees is due to the difficulty of enforcement of a more complex fee
(see Miles (2004)). Fees are required by the Banking Ombudsman to be “calculatable in a way which is understandable
to an ordinary borrower who has no understanding of how money markets work”(Banking Ombudsman’s annual report
1998-1999).
4Since the bank’s swap position will be paying a fixed rate and receiving a floating rate, the bank will make a loss
when wholesale rates fall, and make a profit when wholesale rates rise.
5See, for example: Leece (2000) for the UK, Breslaw et al. (1996) and Zorn and Lea (1989) for Canada, and Daniel
(2008) for Australia.
6See also the discussion of Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Koijen, Van Hemert and Van Nieuwerberger (2009) for
the US.
7Our treatment of the pricing of default risk can be seen to be similar to that of Duffie and Singleton (1999), where
our parameter s is the product of the intensity of default for the security and the expected portion of market value
which is lost in the event of default.
8Our analysis implicitly assumes that markets are complete, and therefore mortgages are redundant securities. In
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so far as households are unable to actually hedge their exposure to wholesale and retail interest rate shocks, this may
be incorrect. The alternative, incomplete markets, approach (see for example, Koijen et al. (2009) and Campbell and
Cocco (2003)) generally requires strong assumptions regarding household investments, and fairly abstract treatment
of the mortgages. Since our analysis is largely focused on the technical details of mortgages, we consider the complete
markets approach more suitable here.
9The model could potentially be augmented to allow borrowers to downsize by adding a third type of suboptimal
prepayment, in which the household’s new mortgage has lower principal than the outstanding loan.
10We note that in some cases, a household may be able to transfer their existing mortgage to a new house, hence
avoiding any break fees. Where this is a possibility, we would regard λ2 as reflecting the probability of moving with a
mismatch between selling one property and buying the new one, which would require creation of a new mortgage.
11This exact system of break fee exists in Denmark, where mortgagors can discharge their mortgage by delivering
mortgage backed bonds to the mortgagee, effectively purchasing another borrower’s mortgage in the secondary market.
See Frankel, Gyntelberg, Kjeldsen and Persson (2004).
12We use the approximations contained in Nowman (1997) for the first and second moments of the r and s innovations,
approximating the covariance as ρ times the product of the standard deviations. We estimate the standard deviation
of the noise in the observed interest rates as separate parameters, constraining these to lie between one basis point
and one percent. To generate the initial unconditional distribution of the state variables, we use our finite difference
scheme to evaluate variances and covariances for the rates over a 30 year timeframe.
13Given empirical evidence from the US corporate bond market, we also should not be surprised to find that default
intensities and losses (measured by s) are negatively correlated with interest rates (measured by r). See, for example,
Duffee (1999).
14Results for Ireland and Australia are qualitatively similar to those for New Zealand, and are available on request
from the authors.
15For the UK case, the transient borrower finds a 5 year flat fee mortgage optimal. For New Zealand, the transient
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borrower also finds a 5 year wholesale fee optimal. For Canada, the transient borrower prefers to float. For the
Canadian case, setting a rate high enough for both borrowers to find five year fixed rates optimal would result in
unrealistically high wholesale rates (see figure 6).
16Many households in Australasia found themselves in exactly such a situation during the recent credit crunch. See
figure 1.
17An accessible reference for PDE solution is Ames (1992). See in particular, pages 349–354.
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Figure 1: Top graph shows five year mortgage rates (solid) and corresponding hedge swap rates
(dashed) for New Zealand. Both are measured in percent. Middle graph shows retail break fees
(solid) and wholesale break fees (dashed) for the same period, assuming a mortgagor took out a
five year fixed rate loan (with 30 year amortisation) and broke this one year later, as a percentage
of principal prepaid. The third graph represents a conservative lower bound on 4-5 year mortgage
refinancing activity (measured in percent) based on bank stocks of mortgages sorted by maturity.
We assume no new business at the five year fixed term and that mortgages in each age category are
uniformly distributed by inception month. Data sourced from Datastream and Reserve Bank of New
Zealand.
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Figure 2: Optimal mortgage refinancing policy for the United Kingdom. Solid line is for break
fee exempt part of mortgage, while dashed line denotes exercise frontier for mortgage once forgiven
portion has been exhausted. Mortgage is initally a thirty year loan, with five year fixed period. Area
above (and to the right of) the curves represents the region in which the mortgage should continue
to be serviced, while area below (and to the left of) the curve is that in which the mortgage should
be prepaid.
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Figure 3: Optimal mortgage refinancing policy for Canada. Solid line is for break fee exempt part
of mortgage, while dashed line denotes exercise frontier for mortgage once forgiven portion has been
exhausted. Mortgage is initally a thirty year loan, with five year fixed period. Area above (and to
the right of) the curves represents the region in which the mortgage should continue to be serviced,
while area below (and to the left of) the curve is that in which the mortgage should be prepaid.
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Figure 4: Optimal mortgage refinancing policy for New Zealand. Solid line is for break fee exempt
part of mortgage, while dashed line denotes exercise frontier for mortgage once forgiven portion has
been exhausted. Mortgage is initally a thirty year loan, with five year fixed period. Area above (and
to the right of) the curves represents the region in which the mortgage should continue to be serviced,
while area below (and to the left of) the curve is that in which the mortgage should be prepaid.
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Figure 5: Optimal mortgage selection in the UK, for intransient (left) and transient (right) borrowers.
Spread and wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respectively). Regions show the mortgage type
which minimises the value of the borrower’s debt for this combination of wholesale rate and credit
spread.
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Figure 6: Optimal mortgage selection in Canada (top) and Ireland (bottom), for intransient (left)
and transient (right) borrowers. Spread and wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respectively).
Regions show the mortgage type which minimises the value of the borrower’s debt for this combination
of wholesale rate and credit spread.
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Figure 7: Optimal mortgage selection in New Zealand (top) and Australia (bottom), for intransient
(left) and transient (right) borrowers. Spread and wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respec-
tively). Regions show the mortgage type which minimises the value of the borrower’s debt for this
combination of wholesale rate and credit spread.
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Figure 8: Value gains for investor (loss for bank) from prepayment exercise in the UK. Spread and
wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respectively). Left graph represents the intransient case,
while right graph represents the transient case. The height of the graph shows the relative reduction
in mortgage value by selecting the optimal mortgage, and following the optimal refinancing rule for
that mortgage, as compared to a borrow and hold strategy.
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Figure 9: Value gains for investor (loss for bank) from prepayment exercise in Canada (top) and
Ireland (bottom). Spread and wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respectively). In each case,
left graph represents the intransient case, while right graph represents the transient case. The height
of the graph shows the relative reduction in mortgage value by selecting the optimal mortgage, and
following the optimal refinancing rule for that mortgage, as compared to a borrow and hold strategy.
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Figure 10: Value gains for investor (loss for bank) from prepayment exercise in New Zealand (top)
and Australia (bottom). Spread and wholesale rate are instantaneous (s and r respectively). In
each case, left graph represents the intransient case, while right graph represents the transient case.
The height of the graph shows the relative reduction in mortgage value by selecting the optimal
mortgage, and following the optimal refinancing rule for that mortgage, as compared to a borrow
and hold strategy.
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Country Break fee types
UK Flat portion of principal, or
Declining portion of principal.
Canada Closed loan: retail break fee (generally with minimum charge), or
Open loan: no break fee.
Ireland Retail break fee.
New Zealand Retail break fee, or
Wholesale break fee.
Australia Retail break fee, or
Wholesale break fee.
Table 1: Summary of break fee regimes for countries in sample.
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Parameter UK Canada Ireland NZ Australia
µr 0.0527 0.0350 0.0263 0.0613 0.0533
ar 0.3922 0.2910 0.2854 0.6590 0.5927
σr 0.0245 0.0134 0.0279 0.0991 0.0937
γr 0.2577 0.1199 0.3606 0.7537 0.7659
ξr -0.1249 -0.7035 -0.7451 -0.3923 -0.2817
r¯ 0.0564 0.0580 0.0513 0.0692 0.0583
Long Wholesale 5 5 3 3 3
µs 0.0157 0.0199 0.0111 0.0209 0.0177
as 0.3980 0.4177 0.0781 0.8773 1.2541
σs 0.0521 0.0346 0.0595 0.0489 0.0683
γs 0.6343 0.3834 0.7310 0.5644 0.7125
ξˆs 4.1055 -0.2359 0.9698 2.5365 1.8345
s¯ 0.0028 0.0246 0.0023 0.0102 0.0132
Long Retail 5 5 (3) 3 3
ρ -0.8630 -0.5793 -0.7682 -0.7060 -0.5725
Table 2: Parameter estimates for the wholesale rate and spread processes. Estimates are generated
by maximum likelihood using a Kalman filter to back out the latent short rate. Long wholesale
refers to the maturity of long-term swap used in conjunction with the 1 month interbank rate for
estimation. Long retail is the maturity of fixed term mortgage rate used for estimation (along with
floating rate). In the case of Ireland, the long term retail rate is an average of 1-5 year maturity
rates, which we take to be representative of a 3 year rate. r¯ and s¯ are the steady state levels for r
and s under the risk-neutral probability measure Q.
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Rate UK Canada NZ
R0(5, 30) 8.02% 7.77% 8.27%
r0(5, 30) 7.18% 4.92% 6.84%
r0 8.94% 4.25% 6.74%
s0 3.09% 3.33% 3.28%
Table 3: Five year retail rates, five year hedge rates, short wholesale rates and short spreads for
the analysis of optimal prepayment. Short rates are as generated from the extended Kalman filter
for December 2009, with wholesale short rates perturbed so that a five year fixed rate mortgage is
optimal for an intransient borrower. Longer term rates are consistent with these short rates and the
parameters given in table 2.
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